

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, DC 20426

OFFICE OF ELECTRIC RELIABILITY

North American Electric Reliability Corporation  
Docket No. RD13-8-000

June 20, 2013

North American Electric Reliability Corporation  
1325 G Street N.W., Suite 600  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Attention: Willie L. Phillips  
Attorney for North American Electric Reliability Corporation

Reference: Petition for Approval of an Interpretation to Reliability Standards TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0

Dear Mr. Phillips:

On April 12, 2013, NERC submitted a filing seeking approval of a proposed interpretation to certain requirements of two Reliability Standards: TPL-003-0a (System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C)) and TPL-004-0 (System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D)).

The interpretation responds to two questions. The first question asks whether an entity has the option of evaluating the effects of either a stuck breaker or protection system failure contingency as presented in Table 1 of TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, or must evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts. The interpretation response states that a planner must evaluate the situation that produces the more severe system results or impacts due to a delayed clearing condition regardless of whether the condition resulted from either a stuck breaker or protection system failure.

The second question asks to what extent does Table 1, footnote (e) of TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system. The interpretation response states that a planner is permitted to use engineering judgment to select the protection system component failures for evaluation that would produce the more severe system results or impact, and the evaluation would

address all protection systems affected by the selected component. The interpretation response further states that a protection system component failure that impacts one or more protection systems and increases the total fault clearing time requires a planner to simulate the full impact (clearing time and facilities removed) on the bulk electric system performance.

Notice of NERC's filing was published in the *Federal Register*, 78 Fed. Reg. 25,260 (2013), with protests and interventions due on or before May 13, 2013.

Notices of intervention and unopposed timely filed motions to intervene are granted pursuant to the operation of Rule 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 C.F.R. § 385.214). No protests were filed.

NERC's uncontested filing is approved pursuant to the relevant authority delegated to the Director, Office of Electric Reliability, under 18 C.F.R. § 375.303(a)(2)(i), effective as of the date of this Order.

This action shall not be construed as approving any other application, including proposed revisions of Electric Reliability Organization or Regional Entity rules or procedures pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 375.303(a)(2)(i). Such action shall not be deemed as recognition of any claimed right or obligation associated therewith and such action is without prejudice to any findings or orders that have been or may hereafter be made by the Commission in any proceeding now pending or hereafter instituted by or against the Electric Reliability Organization or any Regional Entity.

This order constitutes final agency action. Requests for rehearing by the Commission may be filed within 30 days of the date of issuance of this Order pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 385.713.

Sincerely,

Michael Bardee, Director  
Office of Electric Reliability